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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR THE
ENTREPRENEUR
"The ideas which are here expressed so laboriously are ex-
tremely simple and should be obvious. The difficulty lies, not in
the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify,
for those brought up as most of us have been, into every corner
of our minds."
-John Maynard Keynes-
General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money
INTRODUCTION
Over the years, divergent schools of corporate scholarship
have produced a litany of commentary on the topic of corporate
governance, specifically in the context of public corporations.
On the right are those who advocate the shareholder model.
This model, a long-standing doctrine in corporate law, asserts
that the responsibility of corporate directors is to foster the profit
motive of the residual owners, or shareholders.3 On the left are
1 See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18
HARv. J.L. & PUtB. POLY 671 (1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corpo-
rate Governance As A Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495 (1990).
2 The term "shareholder" has been defined by the Revised Model Business and
Corporations Act to mean "the person in whose name shares are registered in the
records of a corporation or the beneficial owner of shares to the extent of the rights
granted by a nominee certificate on file with a corporation." REVISED MODEL Bus.
CORP. ACT § 1.40 (1985). The terms "shareholder and stockholder are ... synony-
mous and may be used as interchangeable terms .... " 11 TIMOTHY P. BJuR & JAMES
SoCHEIM, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5805
(1995).
'See John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Cooperation, Relationship
Management, and the Trialogical Imperative for Corporate Law, 78 MINN. L. REV.
1443, 1462 (1994) ("The viability of the shareholder primacy theory derives from
economic theory; it says that shareholders' unfettered pursuit of maximum profits
promotes economic efficiency ... "); Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Ba-
sis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487,
491-97 (1980) (defending wealth maximization); Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979) (rejecting utilitarianism
in favor of wealth maximization); Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Eco-
nomics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 291 (1979) (recognizing that maximization of
wealth is not among problems associated with economic theory of common law).
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those who advocate the stakeholder model.' Stakeholder model
proponents argue that directors and officers owe a fiduciary duty
to all corporate constituents, or stakeholders. The term
"stakeholders" is defined to include not only shareholders, but
also "suppliers, customers, employees, stockholders, and local
community, as well as management in its role as agent for these
groups."' In the middle is an amalgamation of the shareholder
and stakeholder models which considers the best interests of the
corporation.6 Proponents of this view insist that directors should
These theorists posit the notion that by focusing on the best interests of the
shareholders, directors will enhance corporate wealth and in the process, will best
serve the interests of the non-shareholder constituencies. See Matheson & Olson,
supra, at 1462 (stating that wealth maximization will collaterally promote social
welfare); Marleen A. O'Connor, Introduction to the Symposium on Corporate Mal-
aise Stakeholder Statutes: Cause or Cure?, 21 STETSON L. REV. 3, 5-6 (1991)
(asserting that wealth maximization will benefit employees, customers, and sur-
rounding community); see also Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Busi-
ness is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970, (Magazine), at 32-33
(stating that social responsibility of business is to increase its profits rather than
pursue beneficial social goals).
' See Marleen A. O'Connor, The Human Capital Era: Reconceptualizing Corpo-
rate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 899,
954 (1993). Stakeholder proponents advocate a fiduciary duty owed by directors to
nonshareholder constituents, or stakeholders, such as employees, suppliers, and lo-
cal communities. See id. at 954-55 (arguing that fiduciary duties should be owed to
employees); Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obli-
gation, 1988 DUKE L.J. 879, 915-23 (discussing fiduciary issues in corporate law);
Marleen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts: Recogniz-
ing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1235-44
(1991) (proposing introduction of fiduciary duty to protect worker's reliance on im-
plicit contract).
Professor Marleen O'Connor, one of the leading proponents of directorial fiduci-
ary duties to employees, argues that directors should owe fiduciary duties to work-
ers dislocated by restructurings, layoffs, and plant closings. See O'Connor, Restruc-
turing the Corporation's Nexus of Contracts, supra, at 1235-60. See generally Joseph
W. Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988) (arguing
that employees should have property rights in closing plant).
Certain legal scholars have taken this concept one step further and proffered
the notion that courts should allow stakeholders to sue for breach of fiduciary du-
ties. See Charles Hansen, Other Constituency Statutes: A Search for Perspective, 46
BUS. LAw. 1355, 1372 (1991); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 201, 236-38 (1990); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, A Theoretical and Practical
Framework for Enforcing Corporate Constituency Statutes, 70 TEX. L. REV. 579, 635-
36 (1992) (applying close corporation law by analogy to balance conflicting interests
of shareholders and stakeholders).
" Eric W. Orts, Beyond Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Stat-
utes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 14, 21 (1992) (quoting JAMES W. KUHN & DONALD W.
SHRIVER, JR., BEYOND SUCCESS: CORPORATIONS AND THEIR CRITICS IN THE 1990S
67-68 (1991)).
' See Steven M. H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constitu-
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not afford primacy to any particular stakeholder, but rather to
the corporation as a whole.7
In the wake of the takeover boom of the 1980s, many states
enacted statutes specifically granting corporate directors the
power to consider nonshareholder interests when making deci-
sions involving the corporation.8 These nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes codified the directors' right to consider the best in-
terests of the corporation as a whole.! In many states, this
standard arguably has become the accepted model of corporate
governance for public corporations.'0
It is unclear whether this broad authorization to consider
the interests of the corporation as a whole was extended to direc-
tors of closely-held corporations. Unlike their publicly-held
counterparts, in many states directors of close corporations are
subject to remedial legislation intended to protect noncontrolling
shareholders." Legislatures have provided a statutory remedy
granting the relief of dissolution for illegal, oppressive or
ency Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 167
(1991) (suggesting that "best interests" model is beneficial for all stakeholders, in-
cluding shareholders).
Under this standard, a corporation is most efficient in satisfying all constitu-
ents' interests over the long term if directors are clothed with the authority to de-
velop the corporation's core competence unfettered. See ARTHUR A. THOMPSON, JR.
& A. J. STRICKLAND, M, STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT: CONCEPTS AND CASES 37-38 (6th
ed. 1992).
7 See Wallman, supra note 6, at 165 ("The overriding mandate is that the direc-
tors' duty is owed solely to the corporation, not to shareholders or any other
group."); Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness, 46 Bus. LAW. 241,
244 (1990) (statement of Business Roundtable) ("The thrust of history and law
strongly supports the broader view of the directors' responsibility to carefully weigh
the interests of all stakeholders as part of their responsibility to the corpora-
tion ..... ).
' See Carol B. Swanson, The Turn in Takeovers: A Study in Public Appeasement
and Unstoppable Capitalism, 30 GA. L. REV. 943, 974 (1996); see also Robert A. Ra-
gazzo, Unifying the Law of Hostile Takeovers: Bridging the Unocal/Revlon Gap, 35
ARIz. L. REV. 989, 1023 (1993) (describing general corporate law and legitimacy of
considering interests of nonshareholder constituencies).
9 See Matheson & Olson, supra note 3, at 1466; see also Timothy L. Fort, Corpo-
rate Constituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257, 261-62
(1995) (describing corporate constituency statutes).
"0 See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 971, 1024 (1992) (noting that over half of states have con-
stituency statutes).
" See generally Edwin J. Bradley, An Analysis of the Model Close Corporation
Act and a Proposed Legislative Strategy, 10 J. CORP. L. 817 (1985); F. Hodge O'Neal,
Oppression of Minority Shareholders: Protecting Minority Rights, 35 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 121 (1986).
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fraudulent conduct by the controlling shareholders because non-
controlling shareholders are particularly at risk when disagree-
ments develop in a close corporation.12
Application of the remedy of dissolution in accordance with
the remedial legislation has proved somewhat difficult. 3 In at-
tempting to determine whether specific conduct is sufficiently
oppressive to merit involuntary dissolution, a number of juris-
dictions adopted the reasonable expectations test" which re-
quires that the controlling shareholders of a close corporation act
so as not to defeat objectively reasonable expectations of the non-
controlling shareholders. 5
In the majority of circumstances involving close corpora-
tions, application of the reasonable expectations test is compati-
ble with the best interests of the corporation model of corporate
governance. Decisions by the controlling shareholders that are
made in good faith to benefit the corporation as a whole will gen-
erally meet the reasonable expectations of the noncontrolling
shareholders. Illegal or fraudulent conduct by the controlling
12 See ALA. CODE § 10-2B-14.30 (1994); ARK_ CODE ANN. § 4-27-1430 (Michie
1996); CAL. CORP. CODE § 1800(b)(4) (West 1990) (banning "persistent unfairness"
toward shareholders); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-114-301 (West Supp. 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 14-2-940 (1994); IDAHO CODE § 30-1-97 (1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §
490.1430 (1991); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 3-413 (1993) (limiting action to
shareholders with at least 25% of votes entitled to be cast); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 450.1489 (West 1990); MISS. CODE ANN. §79-4-14.30 (1996); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
351.494 (West 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-938 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-20,
162 (Supp. 1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:14.30 (Supp. 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1996) (limiting remedy to corporations having 25 or fewer
shareholders); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-16-16 (Michie 1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §
1104-a(a)(1) (McKinney 1986) (applying only to plaintiffs who own at least 20% of
shares); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.661 (1993); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1981 (West 1995);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-1.1-90 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (Law Co-op. 1990);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-7-34 (Michie 1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-24-301 (1995);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-1430(2) (1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A § 14.30 (1995);
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-747 (Michie 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.14.300 (West
Supp. 1997); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-41 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.1430 (West 1992);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-1430 (Michie 1989).
13 See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder's Cause of Action for Oppression,
48 BUS. LAW. 699, 709-11 (1993); see also Joshua M. Henderson, Note, Buyout Rem-
edy for Oppressed Minority Shareholders, 47 S.C. L. REV. 195, 199-200 (1995).
'4 See, e.g., Franklin A. Gevurtz, Squeeze-Outs and Freeze-Outs in Limited Li-
ability Companies, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 497, 500 (1995).
'5 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1461, 1467-68 (1989) (discussing reasonable expectation standard and oppres-
sive conduct standard in case law); Thompson, supra note 13, at 712 (explaining op-
pressive conduct standard).
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shareholders, however, would neither meet the reasonable ex-
pectations of the minority shareholders nor be in the best inter-
est of the corporation.
Difficulty arises when the conduct ascribed to the controlling
shareholders under the reasonable expectations test is described
as "oppressive." Unlike fraudulent or illegal conduct, "oppressive
conduct" is not easily defined.16 Since the term "oppressive con-
duct" is somewhat vague, controlling shareholders of a close cor-
poration must effectively make their "best guess" as to whether a
good faith decision in the corporation's best interest defeats the
reasonable expectations of the noncontrolling shareholders." If
the majority guesses wrong, the decision could result in corpo-
rate dissolution. 8
This Note asserts that the application of the reasonable ex-
pectations test to good faith decisions made in the best interest
of a close corporation by controlling shareholders is untenable.
The reasonable expectations test is particularly inappropriate
when applied to start-up entrepreneurial firms. For purposes of
this Note, the term "entrepreneurial firm" describes a close cor-
poration in a rapid growth phase while under the control of an
individual interest. 9 Unlike a mature close corporation, one ul-
timate goal of the entrepreneurial firm, as defined in this Note,
is to become a public corporation.20 After achieving public corpo-
16 See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1179 (N.Y. 1984) (analyzing
standard appropriate for oppressive conduct which triggers involuntary dissolution
in close corporation).
17 See Sandra K. Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Major-
ity Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Pur-
pose?, 97 DICK. L. REV. 227, 229-30 (1993) (asserting that assigning definition of
"oppressive conduct" to judicial interpretation defeats attempts of business corpora-
tion statutes "to provide certainty and clarity in the law to enhance the attractive-
ness of doing business").
" See infra notes 98-116 and accompanying text (discussing remedial legislation
affording remedy of involuntary dissolution to noncontrolling shareholders).
' Generally, an entrepreneur is "one who organizes, manages, and assumes the
risks of a business or enterprise." MERRiAm WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY
387 (10th ed. 1994). On Wall Street, however, an "entrepreneur" or "entrepreneurial
firm" has a special meaning. Financial analysts treat corporations as fitting within
one of three distinct stages: (1) the nascent "entrepreneurial" or "rapid growth"
phase during which the firm is often controlled by an individual interest, as a close
corporation; (2) the expansion phase of "maturing growth;" and (3) the mature
phase. See JEROME B. COHEN, ET AL., TNvEsTMENT ANALYsIs AND PORTFOLIo
MANAGEMENT 341-68 (5th ed. 1987).
See COHEN, supra note 19, at 370-73 (describing growth of firm through initial
start-up phase into mature phase).
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ration status, the entrepreneurial firm will no longer be subject
to the reasonable expectations test.21 It is unreasonable, there-
fore, to limit the growth of entrepreneurial firms by restricting
their decision-making ability while in the early, close corporation
stage. In order to effectively build and invigorate a long term
competitive position in the marketplace, an entrepreneurial firm
should be afforded the right to weigh the best interests of all its
constituents.
When a good faith decision by the controlling shareholders of
an entrepreneurial firm is deemed to be oppressive, this Note
proposes that the standard set by the nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes should trump the application of the reasonable ex-
pectations test. Part I of this Note discusses nonshareholder
constituency statutes and asserts that these statutes should be
applied to entrepreneurial firms. Part II discusses the remedial
legislation allowing involuntary dissolution in close corporations
and the reasonable expectations test. Part III concludes that en-
trepreneurial firms, in particular, deserve the right to consider
the best interests of the corporation as a whole in making corpo-
rate decisions. In essence, this Note proposes that good faith
decisions by controlling shareholders of an entrepreneurial firm
made in the best interests of the corporation should not subject
the company to the risk of involuntary dissolution.
I. NONSHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCY STATUTES
A. Background
Nonshareholder constituency statutes trace their roots back
to the notion that corporations are chartered under the laws of
the states to promote economic growth for their shareholders,
the community, and society as a whole.22 States authorized the
21 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a(a) (McKinney 1986) (allowing remedy
of involuntary dissolution to "[tihe holders of twenty percent or more of all outstand-
ing shares of a corporation, other than a corporation registered as an investment
company under an act of congress entitled 'Investment Company Act of 1940' ... ).
"See RALPH ESTES, TYRANNY OF THE BOTToM LINE 30-32 (1996); see also John
C. Carter, The Rights of Other Corporate Constituencies, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV.
491, 491 (1992) (arguing that "[clorporations, which are entities created by law,
should rightfully have some obligations to the society from which the law arose");
Frank J. Garcia, Note, Protecting Nonshareholder Interests in the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: A Role for State Takeover Statutes, 23 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 507, 513
(1990) (arguing that "the state, as representative of the community, is in a position
[Vol. 71:125
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formation of corporations with the intentions of stimulating the
economy and providing employment for citizens. 3 Early corpo-
rations received special benefits, such as limited liability of
shareholders and continuity of life, in exchange for the obligation
to perform a public service.24 The aforestated theories of corpo-
rate responsibility did not go uncontroverted. Professor Adolf
Berle championed the argument that the board of directors of a
corporation should operate in the best interests of the sharehold-
ers.' To mandate otherwise would engender a "social-economic
absolutism of corporate administrators."2  Berle often debated
with Professor Merrick Dodd over the question: "For Whom Are
Corporate Managers Trustees?"27 Of grave concern to both de-
baters was whether corporations owe a duty of "trusteeship" or
"responsibility" to the interests of corporate stakeholders other
to demand that the enterprise be conducted in a manner that best serves the inter-
ests of the community as a whole").
2See ESTES, supra note 22, at 30.
24 See J. HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN THE LAW
OF THE UNITED STATES: 1780-1970 15 (1970) ("Almost all of the business enterprises
incorporated ... in the formative generation starting in the 1780's were chartered for
activities of some community interest-supplying transport, water, insurance, or
banking facilities."); PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 86-86 (8th ed. 1973).
Without limited liability and the corporation, society could simply not reap
the benefit that comes when large supplies of capital can be attracted to
competing corporations that produce a variety of complementary products,
that pool risks, and that best utilize the economies of sizable research units
and managerial know-how. This is the economic rationale of the legal fic-
tion called the corporation.
SAMUELSON, supra, at 86; Trevor S. Norwitz, "The Metaphysics of Time"." A Radical
Corporate Vision, 46 BUS. LAW. 377, 387 (1991) (asserting that "the corporation is a
legal fiction-a creature of the law-and the benefits of participation in [an] enter-
prise with limited liability are provided for the benefit of society"); Waliman, supra
note 6, at 167 (explaining that states granted certain benefits to corporations be-
cause "society benefits by encouraging corporate growth and vitality").
2See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 310 (Rev. ed. 1968) (arguing that "a corporation 'belongs' to its
shareholders").
26 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45
HARV. L. REV. 1365, 1372 (1932); see Walter M. Cabot, The Free Market Promotes
Long-Term Efficiency That Benefits All Stakeholders, 21 STETSON L. REV. 245, 251
(1991) ("While we should have safety nets and compassion for those who fail, social-
ism is not the answer to America's economic woes.").
27 E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV.
L. REV. 1145, 1148 (1932) (retorting that corporation is "an economic institution
which has a social service as well as a profit-making function"); see also A. A. Berle,
Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931)
(asserting that corporate powers should be "at all times exercisable only for the rat-
able benefit of all the shareholders").
1997]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:125
than shareholders.28
Nevertheless, scholars continued to debate the appropriate
model of corporate governance until "corporate responsibility"
was codified in the form of antitakeover statutes passed by the
states in the 1980s. 29 It is uncertain as to whether such legisla-
tion was passed in response to the concerns of the companies or
of the stakeholders themselves. Some argue that the companies
themselves initiated such reform to create a bulwark in combat-
ing impending threats of hostile takeovers." Others have taken
the position that antitakeover legislation was passed in response
to the stakeholders, many of whom suffered from the effects of
hostile takeovers. While shareholders often benefited from take-
overs by a surge in stock prices, creditors, employees and local
communities were often hurt by the resulting closings or down-
sizing.3
Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a constituency
statute.32 Its legislative history suggests that the interests of
both corporations and corporate stakeholders were equally con-
2" See N. CRAIG SMITH, MORALITY AND THE MARKET: CONSUMER PRESSURE FOR
CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY 64-65 (1990) (discussing social responsibility and trus-
teeship in management).
See generally Alan E. Garfield, State Competence to Regulate Corporate Take-
overs: Lessons from State Takeover Statutes, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 535 (1989).
30 See John C. Anjier, Anti-Takeover Statutes, Shareholders, Stakeholders, and
Risk, 51 LA. L. REV. 561, 578-79 (1990) ("Almost universally, states initially adopted
anti-takeover statutes in response to a single local corporation that was the target of
a hostile bid or was apprehensive that it could become a target."); Roberta Romano,
The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 137 (1987) (stating
that "the concern of a local firm that it might be acquired was quite often the impe-
tus for the legislation."); cf. Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Takeover Wave
of the 1980s, 249 SCI. 745, 748 (1990) (stating that "these laws reflect the desire of
target firms' managers to keep their jobs and their ability to influence state legisla-
tors").
The Scott Paper Company supported the legislation because, at the time, the
company was the target of a hostile takeover attempt from a Canadian firm. See
Virginia Inman, Pennsylvania Senate Is Seen Near Vote on Bill that May Deter Dis-
sident Investors, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 1983, at 12.
31 See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on
Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-Ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 435, 440 (1988) (stating
that takeovers often adversely affect stakeholders); see also Roberta Romano, A
Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 171
(stating that modern constituency statutes "make explicit concerns that may moti-
vate legislators when enacting any takeover regulation, that a takeover will ad-
versely affect the local labor market").
" Ronn S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Addressing
Transition Costs?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 154 (1995); Richard B. Tyler,
Other Constituency Statutes, 59 Mo. L. REv. 373, 390 n.90 (1994).
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
sidered in drafting the legislation.33 Nevertheless, regardless of
whose interests were of paramount importance it remains un-
controverted that constituency statutes were enacted specifically
in response to the hostile takeover movement.34
SENATOR FUMO: ... When [the statute] was originally proposed [by the
Chamber of Commerce] to me I sat back, quite frankly, as a Democrat and
was very surprised. I said this is the kind of legislation I would normally
see come out of the Democratic caucus and not from big business. After
closer scrutiny I ... had some philosophical problems with it.... It was one
of my professors at Wharton [who] put it in a nutshell for me and made
me understand it and made me be at peace with my vote today.... This bill
would basically protect the corporations that are in Pennsylvania.
is bill would prevent foreign interests from coming in and taking over
Pennsylvania corporations and obliterating those corporations, putting
them out of business, milking their assets, milking their cash and, in the
end, increasing unemployment because of the people who they would lay
off after the mergers were consummated.
I say to my colleagues on this side of the aisle that although this appears
to be big business legislation, and it may very well be, our constituents
work in the factories owned by big businesses. We are crazy if we want to
drive those businesses out of our state along with those jobs.
SENATOR FISHER: ... The only thing I know is that it was felt that ...
the bill ... had the complete support of the corporate community in Penn-
sylvania and others such as the labor community ....
SENATOR FUMO: I submit to this Senate that, yes, this bill does help
corporate interests in Pennsylvania, but it helps Pennsylvania in improv-
ing the corporate business climate here so we can keep our jobs here and
hopefully even attract new ones .... I urge all the Members of the Senate
to vote in favor of this bill this time so we can give a very clear message to
the business community, the labor community and to the entire nation
that businesses do, in fact, have a friend in Pennsylvania, and that friend
is its Legislature who [sic] can respond to corporate needs when they are
in the best interests of all the citizens of Pennsylvania.
Orts, supra note 5, at 25-26 n.47 (alteration in original) (citing COMMONwEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1983, at 1431, 1436; Dec. 14, 1983, at
1524).
" "I am not naive .... I also know this bill will probably have a chilling effect on
adverse corporate takeovers." Orts, supra note 5, at 26 (citing COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1983, at 1431, 1436; Dec. 14, 1983, at
1524) (quoting Sen. Fumo). But cf. id. at 26 n.48 (citing COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA, LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL, Dec. 6, 1983, at 1430; Dec. 14, 1983, at 1524)
(statement of Sen. Zemprelli) ("[Qiuite frankly, we are not quite sure what the bill
does."); but see also Committee on Corporate Laws, American Bar Association, Other
Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2257 (1990)
(noting that legislation was enacted to allow directors to consider other factors in
decision making, and such legislation "ha[s] been generally inspired by concern over
unwanted takeovers").
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B. Cryptic Statutory Language
1. Public, Close, or Both?
Generally speaking, constituency statutes allow the direc-
tors of corporations to consider the interests of corporate stake-
holders when making decisions on behalf of the corporation."
These stakeholders include shareholders, employees, suppliers,
customers, and local communities. 6 A number of states have
adopted some form of constituency statutes.37 The New York
constituency statute,38 for example, allows directors to consider
both long-term and short-term interests of the corporation, its
shareholders, 39 and other stakeholders." This statute has been
3' See Orts, supra note 5, at 26.36 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing stakeholder model of cor-
porate governance).
31 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-313(e)
(1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830 (3) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(5)
(Harrison 1994); HAW. REV. STAT. § 415-35(b) (1990); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (1996);
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 1993); IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1995);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101(B) (West 1991); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4)
(Michie Supp. 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 1994); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65
(1996); MINN. STAT. § 302A.251 (1985 & Supp. 1997); MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
8.30(d) (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (West 1991); NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-
2045(1)(c) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1996); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 717(b)
(McKinney Supp. 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Banks-Baldwin 1992);
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1988 & Supp. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 515-16 (1995);
R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-5.2-8(a) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 47-33-4 (Michie 1991);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-727.1 (Michie 1993);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830 (Michie
1989).
' N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b) (McKinney Supp. 1997).
39 See id. Section 717(b) provides, in pertinent part:
In taking action, including, without limitation, action which may involve or
relate to a change or potential change in the control of the corporation, a
director shall be entitled to consider, without limitation, (1) both the long-
term and the short-term interests of the corporation and its sharehold-
ers....
Id.
, See id. Section 717(b) provides:
[A] director shall be entitled to consider...
(2) the effects that the corporation's actions may have in the short-
term or in the long-term upon any of the following:
(i) the prospects for potential growth, development, productivity
and profitability of the corporation;
(ii) the corporation's current employees;
(iii) the corporation's retired employees and other beneficiaries
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
considered "the basic framework for corporate governance in one
of the major industrial and commercial states in the nation."4'
The language of the statute, however, does not specifically desig-
nate the type of corporation to which it applies.42 The New York
statute merely refers to the entity at issue as the "corporation."43
The question remains open as to whether the legislature was re-
ferring only to public corporations, or intended to include close
corporations as well." The Maine nonshareholder constituency
statute45 contains language similar to that of the New York stat-
ute. The Maine statute provides that, "[t]he directors and offi-
cers of a corporation "" may consider other corporate stakehold-
ers. Again, it merely refers to the corporation, leaving the
question of what type of corporation is so empowered unan-
swered.
Other statutes are expressly limited to public corporations.
The Connecticut statute,47 for instance, specifically provides that
receiving or entitled to receive retirement, welfare or similar
benefits from or pursuant to any plan sponsored, or agreement
entered into, by the corporation;
(iv) the corporation's customers and creditors; and
(v) the ability of the corporation to provide, as a going concern,
goods, services, employment opportunities and employment bene-
fits and otherwise to contribute to the communities in which it
does business.
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 717(b). The statute expressly states, however, that its tenor
should not be construed to create fiduciary duties nor afford primacy to any one
particular group. See id.; see also Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140, 1150 (Del. 1989) ("[A]bsent a limited set of circumstances as defined under
Revlon, a board of directors, while always required to act in an informed manner, is
not under any per se duty to maximize shareholder value in the short term, even in
the context of a takeover.").
4' N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 717(b); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW. § 717 commentary at
27 (Richard A. Givens).
42 See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) ('In taking action, including, without limi-
tation, action which may involve or relate to a change or potential change in the
control of the corporation ...") (emphasis added).
43 See id.
"See Ronn S. Davids, Constituency Statutes: An Appropriate Vehicle for Ad-
dressing Transition Costs?, 28 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 193 ("New York's
constituency statute permits the directors of public corporations to consider an ex-
panded group of interests when making decisions on behalf of the corporation.").
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1981 & Supp. 1996).
"Id. Indiana's nonshareholder constituency statute is similarly broad: "A direc-
tor may, in considering the best interests of a corporation, consider the effects of any
action on shareholders, employees, suppliers, and customers of the corporation, and
communities in which offices or other facilities of the corporation are located, and
any other factors the director considers pertinent." IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1989).
41 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-313(e) (West Supp. 1996).
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the director of a public corporation may consider the best inter-
ests of all corporate stakeholders as well as the long-term and
short-term interests of the corporation.48 The South Dakota
statute may be similarly construed.49
2. Hostile Takeover Context
Several nonshareholder constituency statutes are expressly
limited to decisions affecting corporate control." The South Da-
kota statute, for example, is applicable when directors are con-
sidering "action which may involve or relate to a change or po-
tential change in the control of a domestic public corporation.""
The Iowa statute is applicable when directors are "considering a
tender offer or proposal of acquisition, merger, consolidation, or
similar proposal."52  Finally, in Louisiana, the statute applies
when directors are "evaluating a tender offer or an offer to make
a tender or exchange offer or to effect a merger or consolida-
tion.
53
Conversely, nonshareholder constituency statutes in most
other states are more open-ended.54 The Illinois statute,55 for ex-
4 The statute provides, in relevant part:
For purposes of sections 33-364, 33-365 and 33-371, section 33-372 insofar
as it relates to the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of a corpora-
tion whether or not in the usual and regular course of business of the cor-
poration, ... a director of a corporation which has a class of voting stock
registered pursuant to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
... shall consider, in determining what he reasonably believes to be in the
best interests of the corporation, (1) the long-term as well as the short-
term interests of the corporation, (2) the interests of the shareholders,
long-term as well as short-term, including the possibility that those inter-
ests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation,
(3) the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and
suppliers, and (4) community and societal considerations....Id.
4 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (Michie 1996).
"0 IOWA CODE ANN. § 490.1108(1) (West 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92 (G)
(West 1994); MO. ANN. STAT. § 351.347 (West 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §
78.138(4) (Michie 1994); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(3) (West Supp. 1996); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Banks-Baldwin 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 60.357(5) (1) (1988
& Supp. 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 7-5.2-8(a) (1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-103-204 (1995).
"' S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4.
52 IOWA CODE ANN. § 491.101B (West 1991).
"LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:92(G) (West 1994).
"ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202.A (West 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-
313(e) (West 1987 & Supp. 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.0830(3) (West 1993); GA.
CODE ANN. § 22-2202(b)(5) (Harrison 1989); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 415-35(b)
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ample, states that directors and officers may consider the long-
term and short-term interests of the corporation and the effects
of any action upon all corporate stakeholders." The legislature
defined "any action" to "includ[e], without limitation, action
which may involve or relate to a change or potential change in
control of the corporation."57 Thus, it appears that although the
statute was enacted in response to the takeover boom, the legis-
lature found additional merits in an expanded application of the
statute.
C. Limited Judicial Applicability
The language of the constituency statutes does not, in most
states, preclude application to close corporations. The next step,
(Michie 1993); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (1996); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13-A, § 271B.12-210(4) (Banks-Baldwin 1996); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, §
716 (West 1981 & Supp. 1996); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 65 (Law. Co-op. 1996);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A-251 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-
8.30(d) (1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-35(D) (Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW § 717(b) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1996); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715-16
(West 1995); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992); WYO. STAT. § 17-16-830
(1989).
's 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/8.85 (West 1993).
SId.
5 Id. Other states do not go so far as to provide a definition of "any action."
They do, however, contain language alluding to the same idea. For example, con-
sider Kentucky's nonshareholder constituency statute. That statute provides:
(4) In discharging its duties under this section, or otherwise, the board of
directors, in considering the best interests of the corporation, may consider
in addition to the interests of the corporation's shareholders, any of the
following:
(a) The interests of the corporation's employes [sic], suppliers, credi-
tors and customers;
(b) The economy of the state and nation;
(c) Community and societal considerations; and
(d) The long-term as well as short-term interests of the corporation
and its shareholders, including the possibility that these interests may
be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4). Minnesota's nonshareholder constituency
statute provides:
Subd. 5. Considerations. In discharging the duties of the position of direc-
tor, a director may, in considering the best interests of the corporation,
consider the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, suppliers,
and creditors, the economy of the state and nation, community and societal
considerations, and the long-term as well as short-term interests of the
corporation and its shareholders including the possibility that these inter-
ests may be best served by the continued independence of the corporation.
MWINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251.
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therefore, requires reconciliation with court opinions. Unfortu-
nately, only four cases considering constituency statutes have
been reported to date.58 All four cases have addressed the lim-
ited issue of hostile takeover contests in public corporations.
1. The Cases
In Baron v. Strawbridge & Clothier,9 the court applied
Pennsylvania's constituency statute in denying plaintiffs motion
for preliminary injunctive relief against the defendant corpora-
tion and its board of directors." The plaintiff challenged the
board of directors' decision to reclassify the stock in response to a
tender offer.6 In adopting the defensive measure, the court de-
termined that "[i]t was proper for the company to consider the
effects the ... tender offer would have, if successful, on the Com-
pany's employees, customers and community."62
Moreover, in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp. , the court faced the issue of whether the board's refusal to
redeem poison pill rights6 in response to a tender offer was valid
under the statute.65 Relying on Wisconsin's constituency statute,
the court concluded that, "[it could] find no basis to conclude
other than that the board has acted in accord with its fiduciary
responsibilities in a manner reasonably related to the perceived
threat to the corporation, its shareholders, and other constitu-
,,6
encies.
' sSee Orts, supra note 5, at 32.
59 646 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
60 Id. at 696-97.
61 Id. at 692.
62 Id. at 697.
13 708 F. Supp. 984 (E.D. Wis.), affd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.
1989).
'4 Poison pill rights have been defined as: "[A] plan by which shareholders re-
ceive the right to be bought out by the corporation at a substantial premium on the
occurrence of a stated triggering event." Revlon v. Mac Andrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986). For an example of other defensive measures, see
Paramount Comm., Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1144 n.5 (Del. 1989) ("Time had
in place a panoply of defensive devices, including a staggered board, a 'poison pill'
preferred stock rights plan triggered by an acquisition of 15% of the company, a
fifty-day notice period for shareholder motions, and restrictions on shareholders'
ability to call a meeting or act by consent.")
'5Amanda Acquisition Corp., 708 F. Supp. at 1008.
66 Id. at 1016. It is important to note that, while the District Court relied on
Wisconsin's constituency statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.305 (curTent version at
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.0827 (West 1992)), the Court of Appeals relied on Wisconsin's
business combination statute, WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West 1992) (current ver-
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In another relevant case, Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Great
Northern Nekoosa Corp.,67 the court relied on Maine's constitu-
ency statute in upholding a poison pill defense." Georgia-Pacific
brought suit to annul an aspect of Great Northern's poison pill
scheme which afforded directors the ability to schedule a share-
holders' vote on whether to redeem the pill within ninety to one
hundred twenty days of the tender offer." Great Northern's di-
rectors waited until the one hundred twenty-day period
elapsed, 70 and Georgia-Pacific argued that this caused imper-
missible delay.7 The court upheld the directors' decision, citing
Maine's constituency statute. Because of the myriad of interests
directors may consider under the statute, one hundred twenty
days was not deemed patently unreasonable."
A fourth case, Keyser v. Commonwealth National Financial
Corp.," interpreted the Pennsylvania constituency statute.
There, the court applied the statute to a hostile takeover defense
which employed a "white knight defense."74  The plaintiff-
shareholders brought the action, claiming that Commonwealth's
board breached its fiduciary duty by approving a merger agree-
ment and lock-up option with Mellon Bank as a defense against
a potential hostile tender offer from Meridian Bancorp. 75 Al-
though it rejected defendant board's motion for summary judg-
ment, the court noted that under Pennsylvania's constituency
statute, "the Board could consider so-called social issues in
sion at WIS. STAT. ANN. §180.1140-.1144 (West 1992 & Supp. 1996)), in sustaining
the trial court's holding. See Amanda Acquisition Corp., 877 F.2d at 498.
67727 F. Supp. 31 (D. Me. 1989).
68 Id. at 33-34.
'9 Id. at 33.
70 Id. at 32.
71 Id. at 32-33.
72 Georgia Pacific, 727 F. Supp. at 32-33. The court concluded:
Certainly, 120 days is not a patently unreasonable amount of time for the
directors to marshal and present to the shareholders the information on
their position regarding the offer. This is particularly so when Maine law
suggests that the Directors of a corporation, in considering the best inter-
ests of the shareholders and corporation, should also consider the interests
of the company's employees, its customers and suppliers, and communities
in which offices of the corporation are located.
Id. at 33 (citing ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 716 (West 1989)).
73 675 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1987).
' In corporate law, a potential acquirer usually sought out by the target of an
unfriendly takeover to rescue it from the unwanted bidder's takeover. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1596 (6th ed. 1990).
75 Keyser, 675 F. Supp. at 241.
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evaluating merger proposals."76 Particularly, the court insinu-
ated that evidence that board members "express[ed] their con-
cern for the employees of Commonwealth and the community ...,
believing that employee opportunity would be much greater with
Mellon than it would be with Meridian" was relevant to the issue
of compliance with the fiduciary duty of care.77
2. The End of the Line?
The limited case law interpreting nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes might very well remain limited. In recent years,
hostile takeovers have been on the decline.78 In 1991, total ac-
quisitions in the United States fell thirty-four percent to a total
of $142.3 billion, which was seventy-three percent below the
peak level of activity in 1988.7" The decline of hostile acquisi-
tions was even steeper, dropping from almost $127 billion in
1988 to approximately $45.5 billion in 1989, to approximately
$11 billion in 1990."0 As a result, courts may not have the oppor-
tunities to interpret these statutes. Nevertheless, nonshare-
holder constituency statutes will undoubtedly continue to be
applied in the limited context of hostile takeover contests.
D. Summary
By virtue of the foregoing authority, albeit limited, non-
shareholder constituency statutes were unequivocally enacted in
response to hostile takeovers. Most nonshareholder constituency
statutes are not limited by their language to hostile takeover
situations." In addition, most nonshareholder constituency
statutes by their language are not strictly limited to public cor-
71 Id. at 265.
77 Id.
71 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1931, 1931-32 (1991) (citing savings and loan crisis and excessively optimistic fi-
nancial projections as contributing factors); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers:
Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. REG. 119, 178 (1992) (-The collapse of
the junk bond market and the corresponding credit crunch, caused by banking and
financial services sector weakness and new government policies restricting financial
institutions' holding of high yield debt, surely contributed to the decline in take-
overs.").
" Randall Smith, Merger Activity Fell for Third Year in a Row, WALL ST. J.,
Jan. 2, 1992, at R4.
'0 SEcURITIEs DATA COMPANY, THE 1991 DOMESTIC MERGER YEARBOOK 9
(1991).8' See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
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porations. 2 To date, courts have not applied these statutes more
broadly to other corporate law issues.' This limited judicial con-
struction must not foreclose the application of these statutes to
new concepts. Both the language and the policies underlying
these statutes support an application of these statutes to a
broader array of corporate issues in the future." As one com-
mentator has stated, "t]hey have ... certainly not yet brought
'revolution' or 'radical' change to corporate law. The full legal
implications of constituency statutes remain to be seen."'
This Note proposes that the wane of hostile takeovers should
not render constituency statutes moot. Rather, the courts should
apply the statutes to entrepreneurial firms, enabling them to
consider the interests of all stakeholders in making corporate
decisions. It is asserted that entrepreneurial firms, unlike ma-
ture close corporations, are particularly suited to the best inter-
ests of the corporation model of corporate governance. Because
entrepreneurial firms are essentially the initial start-up phase of
corporations which may become public upon maturity, it is rea-
sonable to apply the best interests standard from the outset.
Utilizing these statutes as standards of behavior for entrepre-
neurial firms will result in more profitable, efficient, and socially
responsible corporations.
II. THE CURRENT STANDARD FOR CLOSELY HELD BUSINESSES
A. Intracorporate Disputes
A close corporation is a corporation whose shares are held by
a relatively small number of persons, whose shareholders are the
managers of the corporation, and whose shares are devoid of a
ready market.86 Unlike their counterparts in public corporations,
82See supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
83See Orts, supra note 5, at 34.
e4 Id.
5 Id. at 34-35.
" The Model Statutory Close Corporation Supplement defines the close corpo-
ration as follows:
§ 3. Definition and Election of Statutory Close Corporation Status
(a) A statutory close corporation is a corporation whose articles of in-
corporation contain a statement that the corporation is a statutory
close corporation.
(b) A corporation having 50 or fewer shareholders may become a statu-
tory close corporation by amending its articles of incorporation to in-
clude the statement required by subsection (a). The amendment must
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noncontrolling shareholders in close corporations are particu-
larly vulnerable when disagreements develop with the control-
ling shareholders." Controversy may arise for a number of rea-
sons, including divergent opinions relating to corporate policy0
or personality clashes between shareholders.89 In some respects,
shareholders act as "partners" in the corporation, suggesting the
need for fiduciary duties similar to those in the partnership con-
text." Shareholders, however, are fundamentally different from
be approved by the holders of at least two-thirds of the votes of each
class or series of shares of the corporation, voting as separate voting
groups, whether or not otherwise entitled to vote on amendments. If
the amendment is adopted, a shareholder who voted against the
amendment is entitled to assert dissenters' rights under [MBCA
ch. 13].
MODEL STAT. CLOSE CORP. SUPP. § 3, reprinted in CORPORATIONS AND BUSINESS
ASSOCIATIONS: STATUTES, RULES, MATERIALS AND FORMS (Melvin Aron Eisenberg,
ed., 1995); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (1991); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co.,
328 N.E.2d 505, 511 (Mass. 1975) (characterizing close corporation as being defined
by: "(1) a small number of stockholders; (2) no ready market for the corporate stock;
and (3) substantial majority stockholder participation in the management, direction
and operations of the corporation').
One popular definition states that a "close corporation is a corporation whose
shares are not generally traded in the securities market." F. HODGE O'NEAL &
ROBERT B. THOMPSON, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE 1.02 (3d ed.
1992).
See Kathleen L. Kuhlman, Beyond Crosby v. Bean Ohio Courts Extend Pro-
tection of Minority Stockholders of Close Corporations, 27 AKRON L. REV. 477, 478
(1994) (noting that vulnerability of minority stockholder is distinguishing character-
istic of close corporations); Adam Chernichaw, Note, Oppressed Shareholders in
Close Corporations: A Market-Oriented Statutory Remedy, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 501,
508 (1994) (describing various vulnerabilities of minority stockholder in close corpo-
rations).
" See Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business
Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and Close Cor-
porations, 67 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
8 See id.
90 In partnership law, the standard of conduct is more than good faith. Chief
Judge Cardozo articulated the higher standard as "[niot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive...." Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546
(N.Y. 1928); see Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460 P.2d 464, 471 (Cal. 1969). Jus-
tice Traynor described the fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders to minority
shareholders as follows:
[M]ajority shareholders, either singly or acting in concert to accomplish a
joint purpose, have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the
corporation to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just and
equitable manner. Majority shareholders may not use their power to con-
trol corporate activities to benefit themselves alone or in a manner detri-
mental to the minority. Any use to which they put the corporation or their
power to control the corporation must benefit all shareholders proportion-
ately and must not conflict with the proper conduct of the corporation's
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partners. Partners face unlimited liability,9' thereby requiring
the additional protection provided by the fiduciary duties of
partnership law.92 Shareholders, on the other hand, enjoy lim-
ited liability,93 and therefore need less protection.94 The fiduciary
duties found in partnership law are tempered in their applica-
tion to corporate law. In order to comply with their fiduciary
duties, shareholders must show good faith" and exhibit a legiti-
mate business purpose." If the controlling shareholders meet
this threshold, the burden shifts to the noncontrolling share-
holders to "demonstrate that the same legitimate objective could
have been achieved through an alternative course of action less
harmful to the minority's interest."97
In recognition of the risks borne by noncontrolling share-
holders, a number of states adopted remedial legislation provid-
ing them with the remedy of dissolution for specific conduct.99
business.
Jones, 460 P.2d at 471; see Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 (holding that "stockholders
in the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fiduciary duty in
the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to one another").
91 UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15, 6 U.LA. 456 (1995); REV. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 306, 6 U.L.A. 45 (1995).
See Robert W. Hillman, Private Ordering Within Partnerships, 41 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 425, 424-66 (1987) (discussing fiduciary duty in partnership as one of its main
shields against unfair dealings).
93 See WiLLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN A. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 117 (7th ed.
1995). "General partners are personally liable for obligations that arise out of the
conduct of their business. In contrast, shareholders of a corporation are not per-
sonally liable for corporate obligations. This legal rule is conventionally expressed
by the statement that shareholders have limited liability." Id.
94See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Unlimited Shareholder Liability Through a
Procedural Lens, 106 HARV. L. REV. 387, 390 (1992).
9' See Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass.
1976) (stating that such "selfish ownership, in the corporation ... should be balanced
against the ... [majority's] fiduciary obligation to the minority.").
9"Id.
In asking this question, we acknowledge the fact that the controlling group
in a close corporation must have some room to maneuver in establishing
the business policy of the corporation. It must have a large measure of dis-
cretion, for example, in declaring or withholding dividends, deciding
whether to merge or consolidate, establishing the salaries of corporate offi-
cers, dismissing directors with or without cause, and hiring and firing cor-
porate employees.Id.
, See Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663; see also Hallahan v. Haltom Corp., 385 N.E.2d
1033, 1034 (Mass. App. Ct. 1979); Daniels v. Thomas, Dean & Hoskins, Inc., 804
P.2d 359, 366 (Mont. 1990).
9" See supra note 12 and accompanying text (listing states which have passed
statutes granting remedy of involuntary dissolution).
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New York, for example, enacted section 1104-a of the Business
Corporation Law." This statute provides for the dissolution of a
close corporation when " ... those in control of the corporation
have been guilty of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions to-
ward the complaining shareholders ..... " The term "oppressive
conduct," as used in the statute, has proved difficult to define.
The issues of what may be deemed oppressive conduct and what
justifies the dissolution of a close corporation were left to the
courts to determine.'0 '
B. Oppressive Conduct and the Reasonable Expectations
Analysis
In In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc.,0 2 the court addressed the ap-
propriate standard for oppressive conduct triggering involuntary
dissolution in a close corporation. 3 The plaintiffs seeking disso-
lution were two long-term, key employees of the defendant, a
N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1104-a provides:
(a) The Holders of twenty percent or more of all outstanding shares of a
corporation, other than a corporation registered as an investment company
under an act of congress entitled "Investment Company Act of 1940", no
shares of which are listed on a national securities exchange or regularly
quoted in an over-the-counter market by one or more members of a na-
tional or an affiliated securities association, who are entitled to vote in an
election of directors may present a petition of dissolution on one or more of
the following grounds:
(1) The directors or those in control of the corporation have been guilty
of illegal, fraudulent or oppressive actions toward the complaining
shareholders;
(2) The property or assets of the corporation are being looted, wasted,
or diverted for non-corporate purposes by its directors, officers or
those in control of the corporation.
(b) The court, in determining whether to proceed with involuntary
dissolution pursuant to this section, shall take into account:
(1) Whether liquidation of the corporation is the only feasible
means whereby the petitioners may reasonably expect to ob-
tain a fair return on their investment; and
(2) Whether liquidation of the corporation is reasonable nec-
essary for the protection of the rights and interests of any
substantial number of shareholders or of the petitioners....
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1104-a (McKinney 1986).
"0 Id. § 1104-a(a)(1).
'0' See In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1178 (1984); Melvin Aron
Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1467 (1989)
(discussing reasonable expectation standard and oppressive conduct standard in
case law).
102 Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1173.
"3 Id. at 1179.
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close corporation."M The plaintiffs were two of eight shareholders
and held 20.33% of the corporation's total outstanding stock.' It
was a long-standing practice within the corporation to make
year-end distributions to shareholders and, in the event a share-
holder retired, for the corporation to buy out the retiree.' When
the plaintiffs were no longer employees of the corporation
(although they retained their equity in the corporation), the cor-
poration changed its policy so that earnings were no longer based
upon shareholder status, but upon service rendered.0 7 This pol-
icy thus eliminated any chance for plaintiffs to receive a return
on their investments.' As a result, plaintiffs sought dissolution
pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law section 1104-
a.0 9 They argued that the directors' "fraudulent and oppressive"
conduct rendered their stock "a virtually worthless asset." 0
In its finding of oppressive conduct, the Court of Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's holding in favor of the plaintiffs."' Be-
cause the majority did not proffer an alternative course of action
more favorable to the minority, the court determined that the
fairest result required a buyout option, even though the minority
did not request it." In so holding, the court adopted a
"reasonable expectations" analysis."' When considering the mi-
10 Id. at 1176.
"05 Id.
108 Id.
117 Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1180.
"o Id.
"' Id. at 1176.
118 Id.
. Id. at 1180.
" Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1181.
3 Id.; see Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 558 (N.C. 1983). In Meisel-
man, Judge Frye stated that:
Professor O'Neal, perhaps the foremost authority on close corporations,
points out that many close corporations are companies based on personal
relationships that give rise to certain 'reasonable expectations' on the part
of those acquiring an interest in the close corporation. Those 'reasonable
expectations' include, for example, the parties' expectation that they will
participate in the management of the business or be employed by the com-
pany.
Meiselman, supra, at 558. This doctrine has become more and more accepted. See
Harry J. Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits as a Rem-
edy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 25 (1987).
The reasonable expectations doctrine has been gaining wide acceptance in the
past few years. Decisions in at least eight states have explicitly adopted this con-
cept, and decisions in at least nine additional states have implicitly recognized it.
The approval of the reasonable expectations doctrine by the New York Court of Ap-
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nority's petition for dissolution, a court must look to what the
majority shareholders knew, or should have known, the minor-
ity's expectations were in entering the business endeavor."'
Those expectations, viewed objectively, must be "both reasonable
under the circumstances and ... central to the petitioner's deci-
sion to join the venture.""5 These expectations may not take into
account hope and desire for success because disappointment in
and of itself is not a ground for dissolution."6
C. Controlling Shareholders and Their Right to Consider the
Interests of All Stakeholders
In essence, the reasonable expectations test, a doctrine ac-
cepted in several states,"' bestows upon controlling shareholders
an obligation to ensure that corporate decisions conform to the
reasonable expectations of the noncontrolling shareholders.' 8
They may not deprive the latter of the ability to receive a return
on their investment."' In the case of entrepreneurial firms, this
peals in the 1984 case of In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc. is quite significant and will un-
doubtedly influence other courts. Id. at 37-38 (footnotes omitted). But see Hillman,
supra note 88, at 77 (submitting need for limitations under reasonable expectations
test, including showing by dissatisfied participant that "(1) he or she became a par-
ticipant because of a substantial expectation or set of expectations known or as-
sumed by the other participants; (2) that the prospect that the expectation will be
achieved is unlikely; and (3) that the failure to achieve the expectation was in large
part beyond the control of the participant").
114 See Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1179.
"1 Id.
116 Id.
17 See Stefano v. Coppock, 705 P.2d 443, 446 n.3 (Alaska 1985); Smith v. Leon-
ard, 876 S.W.2d 266, 272 (Ark. 1994); Bauer v. Bauer, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 377, 381 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1996); Retzer v. Retzer, 578 So. 2d 580, 594 (Miss. 1990); Balvik v.
Sylvester, 411 N.W.2d 383, 387-88 (N.D. 1987); Gee v. Blue Stone Heights Hunting
Club, Inc., 604 A.2d 1141, 1145 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1992).
18 See, e.g., Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 388 (finding that in light of "fiduciary duty"
and "reasonable expectation" concepts, minority shareholder who had been "frozen-
out" was entitled to relief); Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C.
1983) (finding that shareholder's rights in corporation include shareholder's reason-
able expectations and these rights are to be protected by courts in shareholder
suits); Kemp & Beatley, 473 N.E.2d at 1179-80 (upholding order of dissolution where
majority shareholder's conduct "substantially defeat[ed] expectations that, objec-
tively viewed, were both reasonable under circumstances and were central to peti-
tioners decision to join the venture."). See generally O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra
note 86 (positing that minority shareholders are entitled to enforce certain reason-
able expectations, including voice in management).
" See J.C. Bruno, "Reasonable Expectations" - A Primer on an Oppressive
Standard, 71 MICH B. J. 434, 434-35 (1992) (citing O'NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note
86, suggesting that minority shareholders are entitled to enforce rights to return on
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Note asserts that compliance with nonshareholder constituency
statutes should preclude the application of the reasonable expec-
tations test. Although noncontrolling shareholders must be af-
forded protection from freeze-outs by controlling shareholders,
good faith corporate decisions which may be deemed oppressive
should not subject entrepreneurial firms to involuntary dissolu-
tion.
III. APPLICATION OF THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CORPORATION
MODEL TO ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMs
It is asserted that, in most circumstances, corporate deci-
sions made by the controlling shareholders of entrepreneurial
firms will meet both the reasonable expectations test and con-
form to the best interests of the corporation model. In the un-
usual situation, however, in which a decision by an entrepre-
neurial firm made in the best interests of the corporation fails to
meet the reasonable expectations of the noncontrolling share-
holders, the standard provided by the nonshareholder constitu-
ency statutes should trump the reasonable expectations test.
Entrepreneurial firms are in a unique position with regard
to the majority of closely-held corporations. Many would argue
that most people go into business for one reason and one reason
only: to make money."' This author loathes to embrace that as-
sertion as the eleventh commandment. Entrepreneurs, on the
other hand, are motivated by freedom." They value the freedom
to be independent and autonomous-to start a business and
work toward creating an empire. Entrepreneurs need to be free
investment); see also Balvik, 411 N.W.2d at 387-88 (finding that where minority
shareholder has been frozen-out by termination of employment and thereby denied
primary means for obtaining return on investment, minority shareholder was enti-
tled to relief).
1 George B. Hall, Keep the "Advertising" in "Advertising Injury," Part Two, 23
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. 17 (Intell. Prop. 1996) ("In a business venture, virtually every
activity is designed to make money and therefore to promote the business enter-
prise."); cf Joseph A. Sommer, The Subsidiary: Doctrine Without a Cause?, 59
FoRDHAM L. REV. 227, 233 (1990) (noting that while subsidiary corporation is not in
business to make money for itself, it exists "to generate profits for its parent or its
parent's shareholders").
121 See WILSON HARRELL, FOR ENTREPRENEURS ONLY 150 (1994).
It is the quest for freedom that fuels the entrepreneurial spirit. Free to be
your own person; free to get your head above the crowd; free to have an
idea, and turn that idea into a company, and that company into an empire,
if you can.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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to take an idea and implement it according to their own business
plan, without noncontrolling shareholders impeding the growth
process. Most importantly, entrepreneurs should be free to con-
sider their employees, customers, and fellow owners. Finally,
the entrepreneurial mind behind the venture should be able to
reward employees for commendable work.1
2
Pursuing this dream of freedom involves risk-taking. Risk is
highly influential on corporate strategy. Risk-averters prize con-
servative strategies that return a guaranteed profit." Risk-
takers, on the other hand, thrive on opportunities where bold-
ness may generate great wealth.124 Moderate risk-taking is a
characteristic of entrepreneurial behavior. 125  Entrepreneurs
crave innovation and strategic offense while eschewing imitation
and defensive conservatism.
126
Entrepreneurs who control a majority interest in close cor-
porations must retain an unbridled prerogative to put short-term
earnings on the backburner for the sake of the corporation and
its future.127 In order to see the dream to fruition, an entrepre-
m Charlie Baum, an early Wal-Mart partner, was quoted as saying:
I've known Sam since his first store in Newport, Arkansas, and I believe
that money is, in some respects, almost immaterial to him. What motivates
the man is the desire to absolutely be on top of the heap. It is not money.
Money drives him crazy now. His question to me at 6 A.M. not long ago
was 'How do you inspire a grandchild to go to work if they know they'll
never have a poor day in their life?'
SAM WALTON WITH JOHN HUEY, SAM WALTON: MADE IN AMERICA. MY STORY 8-9
(1992).
m See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Predation, "Rationality" and Judicial
Somnambulance, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 811, 866 (1996) (describing risk-averters as
those who "systematically prefer smaller, but more certain gains over larger but less
likely gains").
12 See THOMPSON & STRICKLAND, supra note 6, at 46; see also Ronald Henkoff,
Inside America's Biggest Private Company, FORTUNE, July 13, 1992, at 83 ("The es-
sence of Cargil's philosophy is patience. Take calculated risks, reinvest gains, and
hang on for the long haul.").
Yvon Gasse, Elaborations on the Psychology of the Entrepreneur, in EN-
CYCLOPEDIA OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 57-58 (Calvin A. Kent et al. eds., 1982) ("There
is a good deal of agreement about the attitudes and motives that characterize the
entrepreneur: independence, desire for prestige, desire for power, internal locus-of-
control belief, control, high involvement, strong self-actualization and moderate
risk-taking.").
"' "I'm a pretty conservative guy. But for some reason in business, I have al-
ways been driven to buck the system, to innovate, to take things beyond where
they've been ... [I1n the marketplace, I have always been a maverick who enjoys
shaking things up and creating a little anarchy." WALTON, supra note 122, at 47-48.
'2' "[Ihf minority shareholders create pressure for short-term profitability at the
expense of long-term prosperity of the enterprise, prudent management dictates the
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neur must spend money. If the entrepreneur feels that a new
computer system or a better phone system is crucial to the com-
pany's success, then money should be allocated as such, even if it
means less payout for shareholders. An entrepreneur must aim
at seizing its best growth opportunities and finding its niche
rather than divesting the company of capital necessary for
growth."s The controlling shareholders must remain steadfast in
pursuit of their goals rather than resigning themselves to the
pressures of the noncontrolling shareholders and/or outsiders
who feel the corporation should be performing in a certain way."
The controlling shareholders of entrepreneurial firms must
be free to pursue corporate objectives without the fear that it
does not conform to current standards under the reasonable ex-
pectations test. It is true that noncontrolling shareholders have
certain expectations when entering into a venture. 30 Neverthe-
less, the reasonable expectations test as a sole form of analysis
for entrepreneurs must be rejected.'31 The reasonable expecta-
elimination of the minority." Thomas W. Maddi, Note, Nodak Bankcorporation v.
Clark and Lewis v. Clark: Squeezing out "Squeeze-Out" Mergers Under the National
Bank Act, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 763, 774-75 (1994).
='Anne Wells Branscomb, Lessons From the Past: Legal and Medical Data-
bases, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 417, 448 (1995) ("A fimdamental building block of public
policy is to encourage information entrepreneurs to look for and serve niches in the
mosaic of useful information and knowledge to build economic strength [and) create
new jobs .... "); see Bruce Alan Mann & Marcus D. Wilkinson, The Role of Counsel in
Venture Capital Transactions If Disputes Arise, 583 PLI/COMM. 393, 401 (1991)
(noting that private companies rely primarily on earning reinvestment for growth).
"2 See WALTON, supra note 122, at 107-08.
As business leaders, we absolutely cannot afford to get all caught up in
trying to meet the goals that some retail analyst or financial institution in
New York sets for us on a ten-year plan spit out of a computer that some-
body set to compound at such-and-such a rate. If we do that, we take our
eye off the ball ....
If we fail to live up to somebody's hypothetical projection for what we
should be doing, I don't care. It may knock our stock back a little, but we're
in it for the long run. We couldn't care less about what is forecast or what
the market says we ought to do. If we listened very seriously to that sort of
stuff, we never would have gone into small-town discounting in the first
place.
Id.
"' Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551, 563 (N.C. 1983) (suggesting that
courts should determine reasonable expectations on case by case basis); see also
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662 (Mass. 1976) (noting
that these expectations may include shareholders' expectations to participate in
management of corporation).
"' Sandra K Miller, Should the Definition of Oppressive Conduct by Majority
Shareholders Exclude a Consideration of Ethical Conduct and Business Purpose?, 97
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tions test is tenable in situations where the impetus of control-
ling shareholders' decision making is the looting or diverting
corporate assets-truly oppressive conduct.3 2  But when both
parties act in good faith, the corporate governing mode should fo-
cus on the well being of the company and its future. The current
standard is problematic because entrepreneurs who consider the
corporation as a whole may be subject to involuntary dissolu-
tion. 3' Employing the reasonable expectations test as the pri-
mary benchmark arguably creates a fiduciary duty owed by the
controlling to the noncontrolling shareholders. The reasonable
expectations test affords primacy to shareholders, while ignoring
the interests of other stakeholders such as employees, creditors
and the community.3 ' An approach which affords primacy to
compliance with nonshareholder constituency statutes will allow
entrepreneurial firms the freedom to make necessary corporate
decisions without undue fear of repercussions.
CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurs should be allowed to balance the interests of
all constituents, including shareholders, employees, and the sur-
rounding community. Under the current standards of govern-
ance for close corporations the application of the reasonable ex-
pectations test may unduly restrict decisions by the controlling
shareholders. The freedom provided by the best interests of the
corporation model will allow entrepreneurial firms to grow and
compete at the highest level of efficiency. The standard provided
by the nonshareholder constituency statutes, therefore, should
DicK. L. REV. 227, 233 (1993).
132 See, e.g., In re Kemp & Beatley, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1173, 1180 (N.Y. 1984).
1' See supra notes 98-116 and accompanying text (discussing remedy of invol-
untary dissolution for conduct deemed oppressive).
1 See Joseph W. Barlett & Kevin R. Garlitz, Fiduciary Duties in Burn-
out/Cramdown Financings, 20 J. CORP. L. 593, 612-13 (1995) (discussing reasonable
expectations approach as theory of liability for breach of fiduciary duty); Robert B.
Thompson, Corporate Dissolution and Shareholders' Reasonable Expectations, 66
WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988) (arguing for enhanced fiduciary relationship between ma-
jority and minority shareholders using reasonable expectation standard).
135 See Sandra K. Miller, What Remedies Should Be Made Available to the Dis-
satisfied Participant in a Limited Liability Company?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 465, 533
(1994) ("Exclusive use of the reasonable expectation standard may not always be
appropriate ... [Tihere may be many minority interests with equally legitimate but
conflicting reasonable expectations ... [or] the majority's conduct may violate a mi-




trump the application of the reasonable expectations test. Ap-
plying the best interests of the corporation model to close corpo-
rations and affording the ability to consider the interests of all
corporate stakeholders, is ideal. The freedom to innovate, create
and pursue long-term goals will result in a better, more profit-
able corporation for shareholders, stakeholders, and ultimately,
society.
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